Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Twodimensional semantics: Twodimensional are semantics that take into account both the properties of a situation described by a statement and the properties of the utterance situation (which need not be identical with the described situation). For example, the statement that one is at location A, B or C is true when it is uttered at location A, B or C (diagonalization). Statements of a particular form are always true, e.g. "I am here now". In this case, the entire two-dimensional matrix is assigned the value "true". Two-dimensional semantics go back to D. Kaplan (D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, in Perry & Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, 1989, pp. 481-563). See also context/context dependency, diagonalization, diagonal propositions, A-intensions, C-intensions, Stalnaker intensions, character, content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David B. Kaplan on Twodimensional Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
Newen I 120 Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: distinction of utterance context: in it an utterance is made and a truth condition (tr. cond.) is defined - and in an evaluation world : In it the utterance will be evaluated as true or false. >Truth conditions, >Context, >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan. Character/Kaplan: the table, in which (in Kaplan indexical) an utterance is written, and then, in lines the utterance contexts, the evaluation worlds are entered in columns. - Thus, it also takes into account the context dependency of indicators. ((S) E.g. "I'm in NY (Rio/Tokyo)" expressed in NY/Rio/Tokyo.) - Definition Character: Function of possible utterance contexts on truth conditions. - The sentence only gets its truth conditions in an utterance situation. Newen I 121 f Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: differentiates necessary/a priori: necessary: E.g. - "I am Cicero": in the first row only true. - (If true, necessarily true, otherwise necessarily false.) - A priori: E.g. "I am here now" diagonal only true, otherwise false - Diagonal:. Denotes the fact that the time and place are always the place and time of the utterance. - Stalnaker: Proposal: to consider only the diagonal. - Necessary and a priori: E.g. "Cicero is identical with Cicero": here everywhere only true. - - - Stalnaker I 192 Definition character/Kaplan: = Meaning - function of possible (usage-) contexts on speakers - (Newen/Schrenk: the character is the entire table of two-dimensional semantics) - Kaplan Thesis: character and content need to be separated - Character/meaning: is a rule that says how the speaker is determined by facts about the context. - Content/Kaplan: = secondary intension. - Content: may be unknown despite of language skills. - ((s)> E.g. Two omniscient Gods). - ((s) character/(s): E.g. who it could be - Content: Who it really is.) - E.g. to whom "I" refers to. Stalnaker I 194 Content/secondary intention: can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different. - B) because the meaning is different. - (This is part of the metasemantics). Stalnaker I 208 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is determined by the primary intension. - Cognitive value/Stalnaker: is then the character of a thought. >Intension, >Thought._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Kaplan
> Counter arguments in relation to Twodimensional Semantics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27